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THE EXERCISE OF POWER IN PRISON 
ORGANIZATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR LEGITIMACY† 
JOHN WOOLDREDGE* &  
BENJAMIN STEINER** 
 
Extrapolating from Bottoms and Tankebe’s framework for a social 
scientific understanding of “legitimacy,” we argue that differences in how 
correctional officers exercise “power” over prisoners can potentially 
impact their rightful claims to legitimate authority.  Given the implications 
of this argument for the “cultivation” of legitimacy (as discussed by 
Weber), the study described here focused on (a) individual and prison level 
effects on the degree to which officers generally rely on different power 
bases when exercising their authority, and (b) whether more or less 
reliance on different power bases at the facility level impacts prisoners’ 
general perceptions of officers as legitimate authority.  Analyses of 1,740 
officers from forty-five state prisons in Ohio and Kentucky revealed 
significant differences in the use of coercive, reward, expert, referent, and 
positional power based on officer demographics, job training, and 
experiences, and several characteristics of the prisons themselves.  In turn, 
analyses of 5,616 inmates of these same facilities revealed that greater 
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reliance on expert and positional power at the facility level coincided with 
inmate perceptions of officers as more fair, equitable, and competent, while 
greater reliance on coercive power corresponded with perceptions of 
officers as less fair, less equitable, and less competent.  Related foci are 
important for enlightening discussions of the feasibility of maintaining 
legitimate authority in a prison setting. How officers might maintain 
legitimate authority is discussed in light of our specific findings.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In their call for social scientific analyses of legitimacy, Professors 
Bottoms and Tankebe integrated the ideas of several social and political 
philosophers in order to construct a theoretical framework for 
understanding whether government officials can claim “legitimate” 
authority whereby citizens recognize their right to rule.1  An important 
element of this framework borrows from Professor Raz’s argument that 
 
1  Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic 
Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 123–24 
(2012). 
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differences in how power is exercised will influence whether power-holders 
maintain legitimate authority.2  That is, officials who rely more generally on 
coercive force can only be de facto authorities in that they have not 
“secured from their audience a recognition of their right to rule.”3  Officials 
who exercise authority in ways that preserve the dignity and respect of 
citizens, on the other hand, can make valid claims to legitimate authority.4  
We apply this framework to correctional officers’ exercise of power and the 
correlates of different power bases that are relevant for the cultivation of 
legitimacy in a prison setting.5 
Building legitimacy in prison organizations affects not only inmate 
compliance with prison rules but also post-release compliance with the law 
more generally.6  Discussions of legitimacy in prison settings often focus on 
the importance of inmates’ perceptions of prison authority as means of 
promoting safety and order.7  Perceptions of organizational rules and the 
enforcers of those rules as proper and just, should reinforce the credibility 
of prison officials as individuals who deserve the right to govern.8  In turn, 
stronger perceptions of legitimacy should promote order and safety in the 
inmate population by increasing levels of inmate compliance with the 
rules.9  Consistent with this idea, prison ethnographers have observed a link 
between correctional officer legitimacy and prison order.10  From this 
perspective, how officers exert their authority over inmates is critical for 
shaping inmates’ perceptions of legitimacy.11  For example, officers who 
 
2  See JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 128 (1st ed. 2009).  
3  Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 125–26. 
4  See Jonathan Jackson, On the Dual Motivational Force of Legitimate Authority 12 
(London School of Economics Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 4/2015, 2015). 
5  MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 53 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1st ed. 
1978) (Weber’s general observation about the cultivation of legitimacy might also be applied 
to prison authorities.).  
6  See Derrick Franke et al., Legitimacy in Corrections: A Randomized Experiment 
Comparing a Boot Camp with a Prison, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 89, 94 (2010).   
7  See Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy in Corrections: Policy Implications, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 127, 132 (2010). 
8  See Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 124–25. 
9  See Anthony Bottoms, Interpersonal Violence and Social Order in Prisons, in CRIME 
AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH, VOL. 26 205, 253 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia 
eds., 1999); J. Richard Sparks & Anthony E. Bottoms, Legitimacy and Order in Prisons, 46 
BRIT. J. SOC. 45, 50 (1995). 
10  See ALISON LIEBLING ET AL., CAMBRIDGE INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, AN EXPLORATION OF 
STAFF-PRISONER RELATIONSHIPS AT HMP WHITEMOOR: 12 YEARS ON, at 3 (rev. ed. 2011); 
Sparks & Bottoms, supra note 9, at 58–60. 
11  See ALISON LIEBLING ET AL., THE PRISON OFFICER 128–31 (2d ed. 2011); Mike Vuolo 
& Candace Kruttschnitt, Prisoners’ Adjustment, Correctional Officers, and Context, 42 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 307, 319 (2008). 
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rely more on coercion in order to gain inmate compliance may weaken their 
legitimacy in the eyes of inmates whereas officers may strengthen their 
legitimacy who rely more on their expertise for problem solving (such as 
resolving conflict between two inmates by encouraging compromise) or the 
respect they have garnered from inmates over time.12 
Bottoms and Tankebe argued that the “dialogic nature” of legitimacy 
demands an understanding of not just how subjects perceive power-holders 
but also how power-holders behave.13  As such, the study focuses on 
correctional officers’ perceptions of their power over inmates and the 
inmates’ perceptions of officers in order to assess how the exercise of 
power potentially impacts officer authority. A focus on correctional officers 
responds to Bottoms and Tankebe’s call for research on power-holders, and 
more specifically the “junior power-holders” who have the most contact 
with subjects.14   
By definition, prisons are, to some degree, coercive organizations.  
However, Bottoms and Tankebe observed that most prison authorities 
prefer to refrain from the use of force.15  The famous sociologist Max 
Weber described how states have a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force,16 but force is generally not encouraged by officials because, when it 
is used, “consensual authority has failed.”17  Recognizing that consent and 
the cultivation of legitimacy involve ongoing relationships between 
authorities and their subjects, and that force will be used on occasion even 
by legitimate governments, it is important to assess how officers exercise 
their authority in general as opposed to in particular instances.  This is 
because “actions expressive of consent serve to reproduce and reinforce the 
legitimacy of a given set of social arrangements,” which underscores the 
need to reflect the ongoing nature of these relationships.18 
In light of the paucity of empirical studies of this subject, and 
consistent with Bottoms and Tankebe’s call for related research, we 
examined both individual and prison-level influences on correctional 
officers’ reliance on different forms of power in Ohio and Kentucky state 
prisons.  Given the dialogic nature of legitimacy, we also examined whether 
 
12  See JOHN IRWIN, PRISONS IN TURMOIL 22 (1980) (observing the relative 
ineffectiveness of coercion for gaining control over inmates at San Quentin). 
13  Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 129. 
14  Id. at 153 (providing “front-line police and prison officers” as examples of “more 
junior power-holders”). 
15  Id. at 134. 
16  WEBER, supra note 5, at 56 (Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich eds., 1st ed. 1978). 
17  Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 134. 
18  Id. at 136. 
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more or less reliance on different power bases at the facility level impact 
prisoners’ general perceptions of officer legitimacy.  Specifically, we 
examine officers’ fairness, equity, and competency, all of which are 
important contributors to an officer establishing legitimate authority.  
Identifying key influences on the exercise of different forms of power and 
whether broader use of specific forms correspond with inmates’ perceptions 
of officers will contribute to both theoretical and practical discussions of the 
feasibility of establishing legitimate authority in a prison setting. 
I. POWER BASES AS (IL)LEGITIMATE DISPLAYS OF AUTHORITY 
Correctional officers’ claims to legitimate authority can only be valid 
when the organizational rules and the enforcers of those rules are proper 
and just—not just in particular instances, but consistently and over time.19  
The continuity of interactions between officers and inmates that involve 
respectful treatment and preserve the dignity of inmates is necessary for 
establishing prison officials as individuals who deserve the right to 
govern.20 
Borrowing from Raz, Bottoms, and Tankebe’s discussion of how legal 
authorities actually exert their power is critical for determining whether 
these officials have rightful claims to legitimate authority.21  Other prison 
scholars have also discussed the implications of how officers exert their 
authority over inmates for shaping inmates’ perceptions of legitimacy,22 
although Bottoms and Tankebe seem less concerned with assessing 
subjects’ perceptions of particular instances since the behaviors themselves 
applied broadly and consistently define legitimate authority.23 
This discussion begs the question of what constitutes “legitimate” 
versus “illegitimate” displays of authority, and it is in this context we 
describe the importance of recognizing different power bases used by 
correctional officers for making this distinction.  For example, officers who 
rely more on coercion in order to gain inmate compliance weaken their 
claims to legitimate authority because inmates are not willing to follow 
directives. Alternatively, officers who rely more on their expertise for 
 
19  Id. at 125. 
20  Id. at 145. 
21  See id. at 125; RAZ, supra note 2, at 128. 
22  See LIEBLING ET AL., supra note 11; MARK LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 57 
(1st ed. 1980); LUCIEN LOMBARDO, GUARDS IMPRISONED: CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AT WORK 
93–94 (2d ed. 1989); Vuolo & Kruttschnitt, Prisoners’ Adjustment, Correctional Officers, 
and Context: The Foreground and Background of Punishment in Late Modernity, 42 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 307, 319 (2008). 
23  See Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 129. 
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problem solving or the respect they have garnered from inmates over time, 
can make rightful claims to possessing legitimate authority.24  This example 
integrates (a) Raz’s distinction between groups claiming legitimate 
authority although the claim is not deserved versus groups possessing a 
valid claim to legitimate authority,25 with (b) Professor Tyler’s emphasis on 
the impact of how authority is exercised on subjects’ recognition of any 
claim to legitimate authority.26  In other words, groups who rely on raw 
power to enforce rules may do so precisely because their subjects do not 
recognize their right to rule.  On the other hand, groups that display respect 
for citizens and exercise authority in ways that preserve power recipients’ 
dignity are more likely to have secured recipients’ belief in their legitimate 
authority. 
A. POWER BASES WITHIN PRISON ORGANIZATIONS 
The exercise of power involves one person’s ability to influence the 
behavior of another.27  Organizational scholars have argued that employee 
perceptions of how their supervisors exercise power over them can 
positively or negatively impact job performance and satisfaction.28  A 
parallel might be drawn to the use of power by officers over prisoners in 
terms of how different power bases (types of power) are linked to inmates’ 
perceptions of authority.  However, unlike the empirical literature focusing 
 
24  See generally Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1 (discussing how the use of raw 
power undermines legitimate authority); Jackson, supra note 4 (regarding the importance of 
preserving a subject’s respect to establishing legitimate authority in the eyes of power 
recipients). 
25  See RAZ, supra note 2, at 128. 
26  Tom Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 379 (2006). 
27  See John R. P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES 
IN SOCIAL POWER 150, 153 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959); John Hepburn, The Exercise of 
Power in Coercive Organizations: A Study of Prison Guards, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 145, 145 
(1985); WEBER, supra note 5, at 53. 
28  See Jerald Bachman et al., Bases of Supervisory Power: A Comparative Study in Five 
Organization Settings, in CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS 299, 233 (Arnold Tannenbaum ed., 
1st ed. 1968); Jerald Bachman et al., Control, Performance, and Satisfaction: An Analysis of 
Structural and Individual Effects, in CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS 213, 225 (Arnold 
Tannenbaum ed., 1st ed. 1968) [hereinafter, Bachman et al., Control, Performance, and 
Satisfaction]; Paula Carson et al., Social Power Bases: A Meta-analytic Examination of 
Interrelationships and Outcomes, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1150, 1156 (1993); James M. 
Comer, A Psychometric Assessment of a Measure of Sales Representatives’ Power 
Perceptions, 21 J. MARKETING RES. 221, 224 (1984); M. Afzalur Rahim, Relationships of 
Leader Power to Compliance and Satisfaction with Supervision, 15 J. MGM’T. 545, 547 
(1989). 
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on employee satisfaction,29 we do not claim that causality necessarily 
moves from officers’ behaviors to inmates’ perceptions.  That is, officers 
may use coercion to enforce rules because inmates do not acknowledge 
their authority, whereas officers who refrain from force might act as such 
because they feel that inmates acknowledge their right to enforce prison 
rules.  For our purpose, and consistent with Bottoms and Tankebe’s 
discussion of the “dual and interactive character of legitimacy, which 
necessarily involves both power-holders and audiences,”30 we believe that 
officers react to the inmate culture in a particular prison. 
Professor Hepburn focused specifically on the exercise of power by 
correctional officers and adopted Professors French and Raven’s five social 
bases of power for his investigation: legitimate (based on the officer’s 
position in the organization), expert (cooperation based on a belief that the 
officer knows what is best for inmates due to their training and skills), 
referent (an inmate’s respect for an officer leads to compliance), coercive 
(physical force or threat of force used in order to gain compliance from 
inmates), and reward power (implicit or explicit promises of certain benefits 
in exchange for compliance).31 
Based on the terminology, legitimate power is most closely tied to the 
earlier discussion of correctional officer legitimacy.  However, considering 
the broader concept of legitimate authority described above, the ability to 
exercise legitimate power is more likely a consequence of inmates 
perceiving officers as holding “legitimate authority” rather than an 
influence on these perceptions.32  Legitimate power is based on the idea that 
an individual will comply with an order when she perceives the supervisor 
as having a legitimate right to order her to act in a certain way.33  In other 
words, legitimate power operates in prison when inmates perceive prison 
officials as individuals who deserve the right to govern.34  Hereafter, the 
term “positional power” will be used in place of “legitimate power” so as 
not to detract from the larger discussion of the link between legitimacy and 
the exercise of power. 
Outsiders might easily mistake “dull compulsion” for compliance 
based on positional power, where inmates do not challenge de facto 
 
29  Bachman et al., Control, Performance, and Satisfaction, supra note 28, at 225. 
30  Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 119, 121–24. 
31  See French & Raven, supra note 27, at 155–56; Hepburn, supra note 27, at 146–49. 
32  See RICHARD SPARKS ET AL., PRISONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 84–89 (1st ed. 
1996); LIEBLING ET AL., supra note 10, at 98–99; Bottoms, supra note 9.  
33  Hepburn, supra note 27, at 146. 
34  See Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 160. 
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authorities simply because it is easier to acquiesce to the rules.35 The 
correctional officers we observed for our study, on the other hand, seemed 
generally savvy to the difference between the two situations.  For example, 
on occasion throughout the study, some officers in the higher security 
facilities expressed (in different ways) how certain inmates had become so 
dogmatic about their daily routines that they rarely question officers’ 
directives. 
A correctional officer exerts “expert power” when inmates follow 
directives because they believe the officer possesses some special skill or 
knowledge.36  Based on this definition, expert power reflects the exercise of 
a wide range of “skills” from an officer assisting inmates in navigating their 
way around a unit to problem solving to resolve inmate conflicts and 
providing tips on how to protect their property or to avoid placing 
themselves in harm’s way of violent predators.  In this sense, the ability to 
exercise expert power does not mean that obedient inmates always 
recognize an officer’s right to govern.  Yet, in situations where an inmate 
recognizes that an officer’s expertise contributes positively to his well-
being, it could be argued that expert power overlaps somewhat with 
positional power. That is, inmates consciously place confidence in an 
officer to know what is in the inmates’ better interest, thus deferring to the 
officer’s position of authority. 
“Referent power” operates when prisoners follow directives because 
they respect and admire officers.37  Although this might seem naïve in a 
prison context, officers who are fair and impartial tend to get more respect 
from inmates.38  Officers in Hepburn’s study viewed this type of power as 
only moderately important in their jobs, but the potential relevance of 
referent power lies in the idea that, unlike all other power bases, the 
physical presence of an officer is not required for its effectiveness.39  An 
implication of this idea is that an inmate might refrain from engaging in 
misconduct if the inmate values an officer’s opinion of him or her. 
Officers exercise “coercive power” when they punish or threaten to 
 
35  EAMONN CARRABINE, POWER, DISCOURSE AND RESISTANCE 38 (2004). 
36  Hepburn, supra note 27, at 148.  See generally Bertram Raven, The Bases of Power 
and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence, 8 ANALYSIS OF SOC. ISSUES & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2008) (extending Raven’s general definition to correctional officers). 
37  Hepburn, supra note 27, at 149.  
38  See ALISON LIEBLING ASSISTED BY HELEN ARNOLD, PRISONS AND THEIR MORAL 
PERFORMANCE 333 (2004) [hereinafter LIEBLING, MORAL PERFORMANCE]; TERENCE MORRIS 
& PAULINE MORRIS, PENTONVILLE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF AN ENGLISH PRISON 264–65 
(1963); LIEBLING ET AL., supra note 11, at 105–11. 
39  See Hepburn, supra note 27, at 154. 
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punish disobedience.40  Examples of coercive power in prison include 
verbal warnings, intimidation, physical punishments, and segregation.41  
Organizational researchers have suggested that coercive power is “probably 
the only effective power when the organization is confronted with highly 
alienated” participants with little commitment to the goals of the 
organization.42  Although this sounds most applicable to a prison 
population, the unfortunate consequence is the damage coercion can inflict 
on inmates’ perceptions of legitimate prison authority.  The use of coercion 
can enhance rather than diminish anger and cynicism toward the 
administration.43  Moreover, coercion requires “constant escalation in 
severity and frequency of sanctions” if it is going to be used in the long 
term.44  For these reasons, prison officers understand the need to use threats 
sparingly.45 
An officer has “reward power” when inmates perceive that the officer 
is capable and willing to issue particular benefits to inmates in exchange for 
compliance.46  Formal rewards are limited in prison, but officers might offer 
informal rewards.47  A norm of reciprocity arises where, for example, an 
officer may overlook an inmate’s minor rule infraction in return for that 
inmate not causing any problems or making sure other inmates conform to 
 
40  Id. at 147; Hayden P. Smith et al., The Limits of Individual Control? Perceived 
Officer Power and Probationer Compliance, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 241, 242 (2009) (“Power 
becomes salient when an ‘inferior’ actor yields to the will of a ‘superior’ actor, and is forced 
to relinquish personal status, goods, or goals.”). 
41  See Hepburn, supra note 27, at 147. 
42  AMITAI ETZIONI, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 13 (rev. ed. 
1975); see M. Afzalur Rahim & Gabriel F. Buntzman, Supervisory Power Bases, Styles of 
Handling Conflict with Subordinates, and Subordinate Compliance and Satisfaction, 123 J. 
PSYCHOL. 195, 206 (1989) (concluding that subordinates’ perceptions of supervisors’ use of 
coercive power may not be linked to their actual use of coercive power). 
43  KELSEY KAUFFMAN, PRISON OFFICERS AND THEIR WORLD 62 (1988); see also Herman 
Aguinis et al., Power Bases of Faculty Supervisors and Educational Outcomes for Graduate 
Students, 67 J. HIGHER EDUC. 267, 289 (1996) (observing a similar phenomenon within a 
population of graduate students and their faculty); Shelley Johnson Listwan et al., The Pains 
of Imprisonment Revisited, 30 JUST. Q. 144, 162–64 (2013); James E. Zemanek, Jr. & Roger 
P. McIntyre, Power, Dependence, and Satisfaction in a Marketing System, 77 PSYCHOL. REP. 
1155 (1995) (observing a similar phenomenon within a population of customers and 
manufacturers). 
44  KAUFFMAN, supra note 43, at 70. 
45  See LOMBARDO, supra note 22, at 97–100 (arguing that discretion in rule enforcement 
and the use of force is necessary to prevent feeding inmates’ cynicism and resistance to 
authority). 
46  See Hepburn, supra note 27, at 147–48. 
47  Id. 
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the rules.48  This informal practice can easily become the means by which 
officers maintain stability and order,49 yet it is not considered effective in 
the long run.50  Several problems can arise from the use of reward power 
including limited available rewards (e.g., officers can recommend inmates 
for more popular job assignments but those jobs are in short supply),51 the 
use of illegitimate rewards (such as overlooking rule violations),52 and 
unequal distributions of rewards (overlooking rule violations for one inmate 
but not another even though both exhibit similar levels of compliance).53 
B. SHAPING LEGITIMACY WITH DIFFERENT POWER BASES 
It is immediately apparent that some of these power bases are more 
consistent with legitimate authority than others.54  The use of expert, 
referent, and positional power is more consistent with furthering procedural 
justice, mutual respect, and preserving power recipients’ dignity, and, Tyler 
argues, the establishment of procedural justice is a necessary precursor to 
individuals’ perceptions of legitimate authority.55  Moreover, drawing 
regularly from these power bases might lead subordinates to more readily 
accept and follow organizational rules by promoting a less confrontational 
environment.56  The exercise of coercive and reward power, by contrast, 
might reflect a power-holder’s inability to effectively rely on their 
expertise, the respect garnered from inmates, or simply their position in the 
prison bureaucracy for gaining the cooperation of subordinates.  Regarding 
coercive power, Raz characterized individuals who use force as de facto 
authorities because reliance on force suggests that subjects are unwilling to 
comply otherwise and therefore do not recognize the power-holders’ right 
 
48  Id. at 148. 
49  See VICTOR HASSINE, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 117, 117–20 (3d ed. 1999); Richard 
McCleery, Communication Patterns as Bases of Systems of Authority and Power, in 
THEORETICAL STUDIES IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF PRISON 49, 61 (Richard Cloward ed., 1st 
ed. 1960); GRESHAM SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 56 (1st ed. 1958); LOMBARDO, supra 
note 22, at 99. 
50  See Aguinis et al., supra note 43, at 289 (observing a similar phenomenon within a 
population of graduate students and their faculty); Hepburn, supra note 27, at 159–61; Smith 
et al., supra note 40, at 243. See generally Zemanek & McIntyre, supra note 43 (observing a 
similar phenomenon within a population of customers and manufacturers). 
51  See SYKES, supra note 49, at 50. 
52  See Richard Cloward, Social Control in Prison, in PRISON WITHIN SOCIETY 78, 94–95 
(Lawrence Hazelrigg ed. 1968); KAUFFMAN, supra note 43, at 55. 
53  KAUFFMAN, supra note 43, at 54. 
54  See RAZ, supra note 2, at 128.  
55  Tyler, supra note 26, at 379. 
56  See Carson et al., supra note 28, at 1156; Rahim & Buntzman, supra note 42, at 197–
98; Raven, supra note 36, at 14. 
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to govern.57  In a prison setting, another drawback to consider is that 
reliance on coercion and rewards can contribute to resistance and learned 
helplessness (respectively) when used illegitimately.58  Inmates may come 
to expect rewards for good behavior and may only follow rules when 
rewards are possible.  Also, a continued use of force will likely enhance an 
inmate’s disrespect for prison authorities.59  Greater use of reward power or 
coercive power might therefore reflect illegitimate authority. 
Organizations are social groups that exist for the purpose of achieving 
a particular set of goals and are characterized as maintaining the power to 
bring about desired goals.60  Prison organizations, specifically, exist to 
implement punishment and rehabilitation, and the primary responsibilities 
of officers toward these ends include the maintenance of custody, security, 
and control.61  Relative to more “egalitarian” organizations, power 
relationships in a prison are obviously more extreme due to the 
responsibilities of officers and the unique emphasis on managing large 
offender populations.62  As such, the underlying threat of coercion is ever-
present in a prison environment.63  Power is exclusively in the hands of 
prison officials and, when non-violent methods for gaining the compliance 
of inmates fail, officials can resort to physical force.64  The challenge facing 
prison staff, therefore, is to effectively manage inmates without having to 
rely on coercion and rewards in order to establish their legitimacy in the 
eyes of prisoners. 
II. OFFICER AND PRISON EFFECTS ON THE EXERCISE OF POWER 
To our knowledge, there are only a handful of extant studies on how 
correctional officers exercise power over inmates and the possible 
influences on those choices, and there are no published studies of both 
 
57  See RAZ, supra note 2, at 128.  
58  See Lynne Goodstein et al., Personal Control and Inmate Adjustment to Prison, 22 
CRIMINOLOGY 343, 346–48 (1984). 
59  See KAUFFMAN, supra note 43, at 62. 
60  See AMITAI ETZIONI, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS 3 (1964). 
61  John Wooldredge, State Corrections Policy, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 297 
(Virginia Gray, Russell Hanson, & Thad Kousser eds., 10th ed. 2012). 
62  See McCleery, supra note 49, at 49–50; SPARKS ET AL., supra note 32, at 33–34. 
63  See JOHN IRWIN, THE WAREHOUSE PRISON: DISPOSAL OF THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS 
65 (1st ed. 2005); Donald R. Cressey, Prison Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATIONS 1023, 1038 (James March ed., 1965); SPARKS ET AL., supra note 32, at 34–
47. 
64  See CHARLES THOMAS & DAVID PETERSEN, PRISON ORGANIZATIONS AND INMATE 
SUBCULTURES 37–38 (1st ed. 1977). 
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officer and prison-level effects on these choices.65  Related studies in the 
area of policing are also relatively rare, and policing scholars have only 
recently developed analogous bi-level frameworks for understanding both 
police officer and neighborhood effects on the quality of police-citizen 
interactions and how officers exercise authority.66  In the prison context, the 
ability and willingness of correctional officers to rely on certain power 
bases more than others may be rooted in their personal characteristics, 
training, and on-the-job experiences with co-workers and inmates as well as 
the prison environment in which they work.67 
Personal characteristics such as an officer’s sex might influence the 
exercise of power if men tend to be more aggressive (on average) compared 
to women and more apt to rely on force or the threat of force to gain 
compliance among inmates.68  Also, given the disproportionate numbers of 
African-American and Latino inmates in prisons today, White Anglo 
officers may be less sympathetic or tolerant towards minority inmates 
relative to other (minority) officers,69 possibly leading to less reliance on 
expert and referent power.  Age, experience, and a supervisory rank over 
other officers are other factors that could impact the choice of power 
bases,70 if older and more experienced officers are better able to rely on 
their expertise for problem solving or on the respect they may have 
developed over time as a result of treating inmates consistently and in a 
non-confrontational manner.71  Being in a supervisory position might also 
reflect job competence gained through this experience.72 
 
65  See, e.g., Ben Crewe et al., Staff-Prisoner Relationships, Staff Professionalism, and 
the Use of Authority in Public- and Private-Sector Prisons, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 309, 
314–18 (2015); Alexander Ibsen, Ruling by Favors: Prison Guards’ Informal Exercise of 
Institutional Control, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 342, 345–47 (2013); James W. Marquart, 
Prison Guards and the Use of Physical Coercion as a Mechanism of Prisoner Control, 24 
CRIMINOLOGY 347, 349–50 (1986); Stan Stojkovic, Social Bases of Power and Control 
Mechanisms Among Correctional Administrators in a Prison Organization, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 
157, 158–59 (1986); Hepburn, supra note 27, at 145. 
66  See Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Predicting Procedural Justice in Police–Citizen 
Encounters, 43 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 119, 120–15 (2015).   
67  See Hepburn, supra note 27, at 150. 
68  See LIEBLING ET AL., supra note 11, at 72. 
69  See Dana Britton, Perceptions of the Work Environment among Correctional 
Officers: Do Race and Sex Matter?, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 85, 90 (1997). 
70  See Ben Crouch & James Marquart, The Guard in a Changing Prison World, in THE 
KEEPERS 5, 36 (Ben Crouch ed., 1980); see also IRWIN, supra note 12, at 57; LOMBARDO, 
supra note 22, at 94; Hepburn, supra note 27, at 150. 
71  See Hepburn, supra note 27, at 157, 160. 
72  See LOMBARDO, supra note 22, at 94 (discussing the role of experience, not rank, for 
gaining job competence (“personal legitimacy”); this is still noted here because experience 
and promotion are intuitively linked in bureaucratic organizations such as prisons). 
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An officer’s training might also be relevant for shaping his or her 
orientation towards inmates.73  Higher education may make some officers 
more tolerant of individual differences, and proper training (or perceived 
“adequate” training) might provide officers with more viable options when 
problem solving and dealing with more resilient prisoners.74 
Cartwright argued that a supervisor’s choice of power is influenced 
heavily by their perceptions of those they manage.75  For correctional 
officers, their perceptions of the overall level of inmate compliance with 
their directives, the frequency with which they are threatened by inmates, 
and their general feelings of safety could impact their tolerance for dealing 
with prisoners in a more progressive, fair, and consistent fashion.76  
Although not a perception per se, the frequency of contacts with inmates 
could influence an officer’s perceptions of inmates in either a positive or a 
negative way, depending on the quality of these interactions.77  More 
frequent interaction helps to lessen social distance,78 possibly influencing an 
officer’s willingness to refrain from using coercion and rewards while 
relying more on their training and expertise for dealing with resistant 
prisoners. 
Also related to an officer’s orientation towards inmates and job 
competence is how she perceives co-workers and the work environment.  
Co-worker support (assistance with tasks and problem solving, affirmation 
by peers) has been found to promote correctional officer well-being,79 and 
 
73  See IRWIN, supra note 12, at 57; LOMBARDO, supra note 22, at 44–45. 
74  See LIEBLING ET AL., supra note 11, at 148–50 (discussing the role of officer training); 
LOMBARDO, supra note 22, at 42, 44–45. But see Hepburn, supra note 27, at 157 (finding 
that an officer’s education was irrelevant for predicting the use of most power types and 
more education actually corresponded with less use of “expert” power). 
75  See Dorwin Cartwright, Influence, Leadership, Control, in HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATIONS 1, 40 (James March ed., 1965). 
76  See Marquart, supra note 65, at 66 (describing specific situations where noncompliant 
and / or threatening inmates are dealt with by force). 
77  See JOHN T. WHITEHEAD, BURNOUT IN PROBATION AND CORRECTIONS 77 (1989); Eric 
G. Lambert et al., Exploring the Relationship Between Social Support and Job Burnout 
Among Correctional Staff, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1217, 1232 (2010); Wilmar B. 
Schaufeli & Maria C.W. Peeters, Job Stress and Burnout Among Correctional Officers, 7 
INT’L J. STRESS MGMT. 19, 35 (2000).  
78  See Eric D. Poole & Robert M. Regoli, Alienation in Prison: An Examination of the 
Work Relations of Prison Guards, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 251, 266 (observing that “[l]apses of 
fraternization are likely to be met with distrust by inmates”); see also Ben M. Crouch & 
Geoffrey P. Alpert, Sex and Occupational Socialization Among Prison Guards: A 
Longitudinal Study, 9 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 159, 172 (1982) (finding that different genders 
have different tolerance levels for inmates over time, which has implications for the 
differences between female and male officers in their social interactions with inmates). 
79  See Francis E. Cheek & Marie Di Stefano Miller, The Experience of Stress for 
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so it might also promote healthier (less coercive) interactions between 
officers and inmates.  Similarly, less stressful work environments might 
promote more positive officer orientations toward inmates.  Work stress in 
general can generate problems with mental well-being and job 
performance,80 potentially interfering with an officer’s ability to gain the 
compliance of inmates without resorting to coercion or bribes.  Related to a 
stressful work environment is the existence of “role conflict,” which 
officers sometimes face due to the seemingly contradictory goals of security 
and treatment in prison.81  While role problems might promote stress among 
officers,82 they might also contribute to an officer’s frustration with the job 
because the pursuit of multiple goals demands greater use of discretion in 
decision making and is inconsistent with the formal regulations that officers 
are trained to follow.83  A greater willingness to use coercive tactics with 
inmates might be a manifestation of job frustration. 
In addition to individual officers’ characteristics and perceptions of 
their work environment, a number of factors related to the physical features 
of the prison environment might also be relevant for understanding how 
officers choose to exercise their authority. Factors considered here include 
population risk, size, whether a facility houses women or men, and 
architectural design.84 
 
Correction Officers: A Double-Bind Theory of Correctional Stress, 11 J. CRIM. JUST. 105, 
119 (1983); Francis T. Cullen et al., The Social Dimensions of Correctional Officer Stress, 2 
JUST. Q. 505, 510 (1985); Maureen F. Dollard & Anthony H. Winefield, A Test of the 
Demand-Control/Support Model of Work Stress in Correctional Officers, 3 J. OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH AND PSYCH. 243, 251 (1998); Susan Philliber, Thy Brother’s Keeper: A Review of 
the Literature on Correctional Officers, 4 JUST. Q. 9, 19 (1987); Benjamin Steiner & John 
Wooldredge, Individual and Environmental Sources of Work Stress Among Prison Officers, 
42 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 800, 809–10 (2015); Lambert et al., supra note 77, at 1229; Schaufeli 
& Peeters, supra note 77, at 32. 
80  See PETER FINN, ADDRESSING CORRECTIONAL OFFICER STRESS: PROGRAMS AND 
STRATEGIES 16–17 (NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2000); 
CATERINA SPINARIS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN 
UNITED STATES CORRECTIONS PROFESSIONALS: PREVALENCE AND IMPACT ON HEALTH AND 
FUNCTIONING 20 (2012); Steiner & Wooldredge, supra note 79, at 814. 
81  Donald Cressey, Contradictory Directives in Complex Organizations: The Case of the 
Prison, 4 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 14 (1959); Cullen et al., supra note 79, at 508; Schaufeli & 
Peeters, supra note 77, at 34. 
82  LIEBLING ET AL., supra note 11, at 64–67. 
83  See Cullen et al., supra note 79, at 508. 
84  See generally BENJAMIN STEINER, MAINTAINING PRISON ORDER: UNDERSTANDING 
CAUSES OF INMATE MISCONDUCT WITHIN AND ACROSS OHIO CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
(NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2007) (although not tied 
specifically to correctional officers’ use of power, the author provides a discussion of how 
these and other prison level factors might influence the behaviors or attitudes of both inmates 
and officers).  
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A possible link between the risk, including custody level, of an inmate 
population and how officers exercise their power has been discussed by 
many prison scholars,85 although empirical relationships have yet to be 
assessed owing to the relatively small numbers of prisons examined in 
related studies.86  Yet, the risk and custody level of an inmate population 
can shape work stress among officers and tensions between officers and 
inmates,87 potentially affecting the exercise of power.  Higher custody 
levels might coincide with greater use of coercion and rewards to achieve 
inmate compliance if these inmate populations are generally more resistant 
to legal authority, as reflected in the length and severity of their criminal 
histories.  It may also be more difficult for officers to develop respect 
among higher risk inmates or to build inmates’ confidence in officers as 
effective supervisors, and it may be easier for officers in these environments 
to rely on bribery or more coercive means. 
The size of a facility’s population might also shape officers’ 
management strategies given that larger and possibly more crowded prisons 
might introduce greater management difficulties.88  Regarding organizations 
in general, an employee’s ability to effectively communicate with others 
might weaken in larger organizations with greater social density,89 
potentially weakening his or her ability to effectively supervise others. For 
prison organizations in particular, officers working with larger populations 
could face greater difficulties in communicating effectively with inmates as 
well as fellow officers, potentially creating greater uncertainty about their 
work. Greater uncertainty combined with greater anonymity and emotional 
detachment could make it easier for some officers to rely more on coercive 
or reward power if officers in these environments are less likely to focus on 
the potential long-term gains of more positive communications and 
interactions with inmates. 
The idea of environmental threats to an officer’s ability to manage 
inmates might also be extended to whether a prison houses women or men, 
 
85  See Crouch & Alpert, supra note 78, at 167–70; Hepburn, supra note 27, at 159. 
86  See Hepburn, supra note 27, at 150–51. 
87  See Cullen et al., supra note 79, at 508–09. 
88  See Scott D. Camp et al., The Influence of Prisons on Inmate Misconduct: A 
Multilevel Investigation, 20 JUST. Q. 501, 506 (2003); John Wooldredge et al., Considering 
Hierarchical Models for Research on Inmate Behavior: Predicting Misconduct with 
Multilevel Data, 18 JUST. Q. 203, 208 (2001). 
89  See Andrew D. Szilagyi & Winford E. Holland, Changes in Social Density: 
Relationships With Functional Interaction and Perceptions of Job Characteristics, Role 
Stress, and Work Satisfaction, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 28, 29 (1980) (reviewing empirical 
studies which suggest adverse effects of greater social density on work performance and 
satisfaction, particularly in contexts where “interpersonal communications” are necessary). 
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assuming female inmate populations are generally less serious in terms of 
their criminal risk assessments.90  In other words, conflicts between officers 
and inmates may be fewer or less apt to develop into physical 
confrontations in facilities for women, enabling officers to more effectively 
communicate with inmates and to nurture legitimacy without falling back 
on coercion or bribery. 
Aside from the composition of inmate populations, the structural 
environment of a prison might also impact management strategies.91  For 
example, linear (“telephone pole”) designs with celled housing can be more 
sterile working environments relative to campus style designs with 
primarily dormitory housing.92  The latter designs appear to be the least 
restrictive environments for officers, and those working in less restrictive 
environments may gain a greater sense of control over their work space.  By 
contrast, officers in more sterile environments (which are often older 
facilities with other structural limitations) may feel more anonymous and 
detached from co-workers overall.93 
III. METHODS 
The study described here responds to Bottoms and Tankebe’s call for 
research on “junior power-holders” who have regular contact with power 
recipients.94  Our framework began with a discussion of the different ways 
in which correctional officers exercise their power over prisoners and the 
relevance of these different methods for facilitating or inhibiting the 
establishment of legitimate authority.95  This section was intended to 
underscore the importance of identifying both individual and prison-level 
factors that might influence how officers exercise power over inmates, 
potentially influencing the establishment of legitimate authority, and the 
second part of our framework focused directly on these possible influences.  
The empirical analysis described here relates in large part to the second 
 
90  See BARBARA BLOOM ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., GENDER-RESPONSIVE 
STRATEGIES: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WOMEN OFFENDERS 77 
(2003). 
91  Richard Wener, Effectiveness of the Direct Supervision System of Correctional 
Design and Management, 33 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 392, 407 (2006). 
92  Robert G. Morris & John L. Worrall, Prison Architecture and Inmate Misconduct: A 
Multilevel Assessment, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 1083, 1085 (2014). 
93  See Karin Beijersbergen et al., A Social Building? Prison Architecture and Staff–
Prisoner Relationships, 62 CRIME & DELINQ. 843, 850 (2016). 
94  See Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 153, 161. 
95  See generally RAZ, supra note 2, at 128 (applying to correctional officers the author’s 
argument that differences in how power is exercised will influence whether power-holders 
maintain legitimate authority). 
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discussion in our framework.  Also, consistent with Bottoms and Tankebe’s 
discussion of the “dialogic nature” of legitimacy and the importance of 
focusing on reciprocal relationships between power-holders and power 
recipients, the study also included a prison level analysis of the 
correspondence between officers’ reports of how they exercise power and 
inmates’ perceptions of officer legitimacy (specifically, officers’ fairness, 
equity, and competence).96  It is important to treat the findings from the 
second analysis as more exploratory, however, due to limits of cross-
sectional data in addition to the focus on aggregated perceptions at the 
prison level (described below).  To be clear, Bottoms and Tankebe’s 
dialogic approach to an understanding of power-holders’ legitimacy 
involves assessing the dynamic nature of legitimacy in terms of how power-
holders and subjects necessarily react to each other.97  As they argue, this 
demands assessing authority relationships over time in order to appreciate 
the evolution of truly legitimate authority.98  Nonetheless, the second 
analysis is important for establishing a valid connection between what 
officers report and what inmates observe. 
A. SAMPLES AND DATA 
The data examined here was compiled from a broader study of factors 
influencing inmate crime and victimization, and official responses to related 
incidents in Ohio and Kentucky prisons.99  Data collection began in August 
2007 and was completed in December 2008. The states of Ohio and 
Kentucky were deliberately selected for the study based on geographic 
proximity to the principal investigators in conjunction with the number and 
diversity of facilities across the two states. Survey and official data on 
officers and inmates in addition to official data on facilities were compiled 
from all forty-two state operated confinement facilities in Ohio and 
Kentucky and the three privately operated facilities in Ohio.100 
 
96  See Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 129. 
97  Id. at 166. 
98  Id.  
99  See generally STEINER, supra note 84. The author discusses the Ohio study only 
because the original grant focused exclusively on Ohio; Kentucky was subsequently added 
based on extra available resources. There is no project report with a discussion of Kentucky, 
although the differences in sample designs are described in this article. 
100  The three private facilities for adults in Kentucky were excluded per the wishes of 
the Kentucky Department of Correction (KDOC). Prison camps, mental health units, 
reception units, and youthful offender units were excluded due to unmeasured structural and 
managerial differences between those units and the primary facilities in which they existed. 
Prison camp inmates at Ohio State Penitentiary were included for reasons dictated by the 
larger project. 
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Systematic random samples of correctional officers were selected from 
lists of officers and sergeants provided by the forty-five facilities.  We 
selected 36% samples in the Ohio prisons because of an initial plan to draw 
at least one-third of all officers across all shifts, with an anticipated 
response rate of 50%, and available funds permitted increasing these 
proposed samples by 3%.  The Ohio portion of the study was completed 
before Kentucky, and the remaining available resources permitted 
systematic random selection of 100 officers per facility in Kentucky, or all 
officers if there were fewer than 100 employed at a facility.  Samples 
ranged from 19 to 178 officers per facility for a total of 3,857 individuals 
across both states.  The total target sample was reduced to 3,710 officers 
due to transfers, firings, resignations, and leaves of absence. 
Officer surveys were placed in envelopes with a description of the 
study and request for voluntary consent to participate, and a postage paid 
return envelope.  These envelopes were placed in the officers’ mail.  
Follow-up surveys were distributed to non-respondents.  These procedures 
resulted in comparable response rates within each state (50% overall) and 
1,740 usable surveys for the analysis.101  A response rate of 50% 
approximates the norm for related studies of correctional officers.102  All 
cases were weighted inversely to the probability of an officer’s selection in 
their facility, and weights were normalized.  The Ohio sample was 
representative on sex, race / ethnicity, rank, and length of service.  This 
sample was slightly older, however, than the target population ( X = 42.4 
versus   = 41.3).  The Kentucky sample was representative on sex, race / 
ethnicity, and rank.  The population parameters for length of service and 
age were unavailable from the Kentucky Department of Corrections and 
could not be compared to the sample estimates for these variables. 
The analysis of inmates’ perceptions of officers was made possible by 
selecting random samples of inmates from the forty-five facilities.  
Electronic lists of all inmates in each facility permitted the use of simple 
random sampling.  These lists were provided by either the Ohio Department 
of Rehabilitation and Corrections (ODRC) or the Kentucky Department of 
Corrections (KDOC) just a few days before each site visit.  The size of each 
facility sample varied based on the wishes of each state’s Department of 
Corrections (DOC) and of the wardens of the Kentucky facilities.103  Only 
 
101  Whereas the response rate across all officers was 0.50, the average response rate 
across the forty-five facilities was 0.530 with a standard error of 0.021.   
102  See Hepburn, supra note 27, at 150–51. 
103  ODRC dictated two sample sizes based on facility.  We were approved to select 130 
inmates from each of eleven facilities targeted for a longitudinal study, and 260 inmates 
from each of the other facilities.  The goal was to obtain at least 100 inmates per facility in 
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inmates who had served at least six months in the same facility by the 
survey date were sampled to ensure ample exposure to prison staff for 
informing inmates’ responses to our questions.  Random sampling yielded 
7,294 inmates, but this number decreased to 6,997 inmates after excluding 
those who were unavailable at the time of our visit.104 
The inmate survey participation rate was 83% but dropped to 81% 
after removing surveys without responses to key questions, yielding 5,640 
usable surveys for the analysis.105  As with the officer samples, all cases 
were weighted inversely to their odds of selection in each facility. Weighted 
samples were not significantly different from the corresponding inmate 
populations in terms of age, sex, race, committing offense, number of prior 
incarcerations, sentence length, and time served (based on population 
parameters provided by ODRC and KDOC). 
B. MEASURES 
Table 1 provides a description of all measures for the analysis of 
officers’ power bases.  The outcome measures were derived from ten survey 
items tapping the five different power bases, with two items per type.  The 
specific wording of each item is presented in table 1 with responses scaled 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).  Five of the ten items 
reflect Hepburn’s (1985) original wording for each power base, and we 
added one additional item per type in order to capture the slightly broader 
definition of each power base.  A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was 
conducted in Mplus 6.0106 to test our hypothesized factor structure of five 
latent variables reflecting the five power bases.  These findings are 
discussed in the next section although it is important to note at this point 
that the factor structure was supported with some minor modifications to 
the residual variances of some of the ten items (i.e., we allowed a handful of 
 
the first group, and at least 200 inmates per facility in the second.  Kentucky sample sizes 
were dictated by wardens and drawn after data collection in Ohio.  We requested 200 
inmates per facility based on project resources, and wardens adjusted these numbers based 
on actual populations and staff resources.  This led to target samples of 200 inmates (N=4 
prisons), 180 (N=3), 175 (N=1), 160 (N=1), 150 (N=2), 125 (N=1), and 100 (N=1).  The last 
two samples were restricted because one facility was a work release facility, and the other 
prison housed primarily offenders with mental health issues. 
104  Inmates were unavailable because they were released / transferred, posed a safety 
risk, were on a visit, in the infirmary, or were out to court during data collection (Ohio=163; 
Kentucky=134). 
105  Some inmates did not receive a pass to complete the survey although we located 
most of them and offered them the opportunity to participate.  Any inmate had the right to 
refuse participation.   
106  See LINDA MUTHÉN & BENGT MUTHÉN, MPLUS, USER’S GUIDE 51–96 (6th ed. 1998-
2010). 
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non-zero residual correlations in order to improve model fit).  Also, we 
were able to use Restricted Maximum Likelihood estimation with 
conventional standard errors (MLR) rather than Maximum Likelihood 
estimation with standard errors robust to non-normality (MLM) because of 
the non-skewed distributions of the items, as revealed by the kurtosis values 
close to 0.0 (all absolute values less than 1.0).107  In other words, it was not 
necessary to treat these scales as categorical. 
  
 
107  See BARBARA BYRNE, STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING WITH MPLUS: BASIC 
CONCEPTS, APPLICATIONS, AND PROGRAMMING 99, 124 (1st ed. 2012). 
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Table 1 
Description of Officer and Facility Measures 
 Range Mean   SD 
Level-1: Correctional Officers  
  (n1 = 1,740) 
   
Power Bases    
Coercive     
   Inmates typically do what I ask them  
     to because they fear disciplinary  
     actions (C1) 
 





   Inmates typically do what I ask them  
     to because I can apply pressure or  
     penalize them for not cooperating 
      (C2) 
 





Reward     
   Inmates typically do what I ask them  
     to because I have the ability to  
     influence when they are released  
     (REW1) 
 





   Inmates typically do what I ask them  
     to because I can give them special  
     help or benefits (REW2) 
 





Referent     
   Inmates typically do what I ask them  
     to because they want my respect  
     (REF1) 
 





   Inmates typically do what I ask them  
     to because they want my approval  
     (REF1) 
 





Expert     
   Inmates typically do what I ask them  
     to because of my skills and  
     experience (E1) 
 





   Inmates typically do what I ask them  
     to because they think I know what is  
     best for them (E2) 
 





Positional     
   Inmates typically do what I ask them  
     to because they believe I have the  
     authority to tell them what to do (P1) 
 





   Inmates typically do what I ask them  
     to because I am fair (P2) 
 1 - 4  3.45  .59 
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 Range Mean   SD 
Officer Characteristics    
   Male  0 -  1    .77     .42 
   White Anglo  0 -  1    .82     .38 
   Associates Degree or higher  0 -  1    .19     .39 
   Years of service in DOC    0 - 47  9.20   6.94 
   Supervise officers   0 -  1    .07     .25 
Officer Experiences and Perceptions      
   # inmates (in general) talk with face  
     to face on a typical shift?  
 0 - 30 19.12 11.98 
   # times threatened by inmates in past  
     month 
 0 - 10   1.10   2.43 
   I usually feel safe on my shift  1 -  4   3.10     .66 
   Inmates do what you tell them to do  1 -  4   2.99     .76 
   I have received training on how to  
     perform my required tasks 
 0 -  1     .63     .48 
   I am proud to work with the staff in  
     this unit  
 0 -  1     .75     .43 
   Co-workers’ support (5-item factor) -2.4 - 1.7     .00   1.00 
   Work stress (6-item factor) -2.2 - 2.5     .00   1.00 
   Role problems (4-item factor)  -1.5 - 1.8     .00   1.00 
    
Level-2: Facilities (n2 = 45)    
   Average custody level across inmate  
     population  
 1 -  4   1.97     .68 
   Facility for women  0 -  1    .06     .04 
   Linear design with primarily cells  0 -  1    .07     .25 
   Inmate population on day of survey   119-
3000 
 1360   831 
 
Most of the measures of officer characteristics do not need elaboration 
except for supervise officers, which taps whether an officer was in charge 
of overseeing other officers.  Also noteworthy is that an officer’s age was 
left out of the model due to collinearity with years of service in DOC.  We 
also selected the latter over an officer’s years of service in the current 
facility because the two measures correlate at .88 (r), and years spent in 
DOC captures years as an officer at other prisons (which could be relevant 
for an officer’s reliance on certain power bases). 
The first two items tapping “officer experiences and perceptions” 
(listed in table 1) are counts.  The measure “# inmates (in general) talk with 
on a typical shift” was capped at thirty due to the heavily skewed 
distribution of cases beyond this value.  Similarly, “# times threatened by 
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inmates in past month” was capped at ten for the same reason.  The next 
two items in the table reflecting inmate compliance and safety were each 
measured with the same Likert scale used for the outcome measures.  The 
indicators of officer training and pride with co-workers are binary (0 = no; 1 
= yes). 
The last three measures in the sub-section of “experiences and 
perceptions” in table 1 are factors derived from several survey items.  Each 
of the scales is similar to those used by Cullen et al. (1985). “Co-workers’ 
support” is a five-item scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70) including the 
following items: I generally receive help from my co-workers when I ask 
for it; My co-workers volunteer to help handle problems when they come 
up; I receive compliments from my co-workers when I have done my job 
well; My co-workers often blame one another when things go wrong 
(reverse coded); Most of my co-workers do their fair share of the work.108  
“Work stress” is a six-item scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80) including the 
following survey items: I often feel tense or anxious on my shift; My job 
frequently makes me very frustrated; I usually don’t have much to worry 
about on my shift (reverse coded); I am generally pretty calm on my shift 
(reverse coded); I usually feel under a lot of pressure on my shift; and Many 
aspects of my job can make me upset at times.  Finally, “role problems” is a 
four-item scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.69) including the following: The 
rules and policies for officers in this facility are not very clear; There are so 
many people telling me what to do that I am not sure who is in charge; It is 
often unclear who has the authority to make a decision; and The 
administrative staff and my supervisor are generally on the same page 
regarding how policies should be applied (reverse coded). 
Given our use of multi-level modeling (described below), the number 
of independent variables that could be included in the facility level (level-2) 
model was limited due to the degrees of freedom available for an analysis 
of 45 prisons.  The facility level measures displayed in table 1 were selected 
from a much larger pool of available measures.  Criterion for inclusion in 
the model consisted of theoretical relevance (first and foremost) in 
conjunction with statistically significant zero-order relationships with at 
least two of the outcome measures.  A facility’s “average custody level” 
was computed as the average of inmates’ custody scores in each facility.  
These individual scores are determined by each state’s DOC, where inmates 
are classified as either (1) minimum, (2) medium, (3) close, (4) maximum, 
 
108  See HAIR ET AL., MULTIVARIATE DATA ANALYSIS 137 (6th ed. 2006) (stating that 
values of alpha equal to or greater than 0.7 are generally preferred, but values above 0.6 are 
acceptable, especially when analyzing reliabilities of scales made up of only a handful of 
items). 
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or (5) administrative maximum custody.  A four-category scale was created 
by collapsing categories (4) and (5) due to the relatively small numbers of 
inmates in (5).109  The average of the four-category scale was then 
computed. 
“Inmate population” is the total head count of inmates in each facility 
on the day of the survey.  Regarding the dichotomous measure of “facility 
for women” (0 = no; 1 = yes), there were no co-ed facilities in the sample, 
so this measure reflects prisons housing women only.  Finally, the 
dichotomous measure of “linear design with primarily cells” (0 = no; 1 = 
yes) reflects any design with corridors of cells instead of more “open” pods 
with cells surrounding the full or a partial perimeter.  Examples of “linear 
designs” include a telephone pole design, catwalks with cells facing each 
other, and tiered designs with cells facing a wall. 
Many more facility measures were considered for the level-2 model, 
including indicators of inmate deviance (number of fights during the 
previous month, number of attempted escapes, proportion of inmates in 
disciplinary housing), victimization levels (proportion of inmates 
victimized by physical assaults during previous six months, proportion 
victimized by thefts), wardens’ perceptions of adequate resources for a safe 
environment, facility design aside from “linear with cells” (campus style 
with primarily cells, campus style with primarily dorms, and linear design 
with primarily dorms), design capacity, ratio of inmates to capacity on 
survey day, ratio of officers to inmates on survey day, indicators of physical 
disorder, and noise levels.  Some of these were also significant predictors of 
at least two outcomes but were dropped because of overlap with the 
measures included in conjunction with a more peripheral relevance to the 
topic (e.g., wardens’ perceptions of safe environments).110 
Regarding the facility level analysis of inmates’ perceptions of officer 
legitimacy, a latent dependent variable was created with CFA from four 
inmate survey items measured on Likert scales. These items included 
“[o]verall, the correctional officers here do a good job,” “[t]he correctional 
officers are generally fair to inmates,” “[c]orrectional officers treat me the 
same as any other inmate here,” and “[c]orrectional officers treat some 
inmates better than others (reverse coded).”111  Table 2 provides a 
description of these items.  
 
109  A potential drawback to collapsing these two groups is that “maximum security” 
classification is based on risk whereas “administrative maximum security” classification 
reflects administrative needs.   
110  Results from the analysis of these empirical relationships with the outcome measures 
are available upon request from the first author. 
111  CFI/TLI = 0.97; RMSEA/SRMSR = 0.03. 
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Table 2 
Description of Inmate Perceptions of Officer Legitimacy 
 Range Mean   SD 
Level-1: Inmates (n1 = 5,616)    
Perceptions of Officer Legitimacy    
  Overall, the correctional officers here  
    do a good job. 
1 - 4 2.48 .93 
  The correctional officers are generally  
    fair to inmates. 
1 - 4 2.42 .91 
  Correctional officers treat me the same  
    as any other inmate here. 
 





  Correctional officers treat some  
    inmates better than others (reverse coded). 
 






The second analysis also involved multi-level modeling (see below), 
but the inmate level variables are not described here because they served 
strictly as control variables.112  The independent variables of interest to this 
part of the study included facility level averages of the latent “power base” 
variables described above.  As for the analysis of officer power bases as 
outcomes, we were able to use MLR for the analysis of officer performance 
due to the non-skewed distribution of the outcome. 
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Multi-level modeling was used because of the research design with 
officers and inmates nested within prisons.113  Generalized linear modeling 
in Mplus 6.0 was used for the analyses of both officer power bases and 
inmates’ perceptions of officers, following our earlier observation regarding 
the non-skewed distributions of these outcome measures. 
 
112  Descriptions of these variable distributions are available upon request from the first 
author. Statistical controls included an inmate’s age, sex, race, marital status at time of 
survey, employment status prior to incarceration, whether an inmate had a high school 
diploma, gang membership prior to incarceration, drug use in month before arrest, 
incarcerated for a violent offense, prior incarceration in prison, security risk level, number of 
months served in facility, number of hours in education classes per week, number of hours at 
work assignment per week, number of hours in recreation per week, victim of theft during 
last six months, victim of assault during last six months, and whether an inmate was 
confronted by correctional staff for a rule violation during the last six months.   
113  Compiling data for two different states demanded consideration of nesting prisons 
within states for the analysis.  This procedure was deemed unnecessary based on an analysis 
of random effects at the state level to determine whether the inmate and facility effects 
varied significantly between Ohio and Kentucky.  The absence of any significantly varying 
effects allowed us to pool the two samples.  
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For the analysis of power bases as outcomes, unconditional (null) 
models revealed significant between-prison variance in each outcome (p < 
.01), indicating that it would be worthwhile to estimate level-2 effects on 
officers’ use of power.  Random coefficients models were then estimated in 
order to identify the inmate level (level-1) effects that varied significantly 
across prisons.  The significantly varying slopes (p < .05) were kept as 
random in the final models, whereas all other level-1 effects were fixed.  
All level-1 measures were grand mean-centered to control for 
compositional differences in officer samples across prisons that might have 
been linked to between-prison differences in the outcomes.  The next stage 
of this analysis involved estimating the full multi-level models with both 
level-1 and level-2 predictors included.  Level-1 model intercepts were 
treated as random at this stage, and level-2 effects on these intercepts 
(“intercepts-as-outcomes”) reflected prison effects on the adjusted mean 
levels of officers’ exercise of power across the forty-five prisons (i.e., 
“adjusted” once controlling for compositional effects derived from the 
level-1 predictors). 
The analysis of inmate perceptions of officer legitimacy also involved 
multi-level modeling, but only to control for compositional differences 
across prison facilities in the inmate level factors noted earlier.  Therefore, 
the latent variable tapping officer legitimacy was entered as a level-1 
dependent variable in these models, and the facility level portion of each 
model treated the average of officer legitimacy for each facility as the level-
2 dependent variable.  The level-2 independent variables consisted of 
facility level averages of the officer “power base” measures, as described 
above. 
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The univariate descriptives in table 1 reveal the relative distributions 
of the ten survey items comprising the five outcome measures of officer 
power bases.  On average, correctional officers claimed to rely on coercive 
power to the same extent as they rely on referent and expert power.  This is 
somewhat surprising given the less desirable connotations of coercive 
power relative to the two other types.  On the other hand, officers rely on 
these three types more than they claimed to rely on reward power, which 
ranked the lowest of all five bases examined.114  Officers claimed to 
exercise positional power to a larger degree than any other form.115  
The CFA of these ten survey items revealed that all items loaded 
 
114  See Hepburn, supra note 27, at 154. 
115  See id. 
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significantly on five separate factors, as hypothesized (CFI/TLI = 0.98; 
RMSEA = .046; SRMSR = 0.26).  However, there were some important 
modifications made to the CFA in order to meet the criteria of CFI/TLI > 
0.95 and RMSEA/SRMSR < 0.05 for good model fit.116  These included 
allowing the following pairs of residual co-variances to maintain non-zero 
positive correlations (see table 1 for abbreviations): P2 with E1, P2 with 
REF1, E2 with both REF1 and REF2, and REW2 with both C1 and C2; and 
allowing the following pairs to maintain non-zero negative correlations: P1 
with C1, and P2 with both REW1 and REW2.  Oblique rotation was used 
for the CFA.  These findings led us to use the latent variables identified 
from the CFA as outcomes in the multivariate bi-level models.  Table 3 




116  See Byrne, supra note 107, at 68–69, 72–73 (discussing these fit criterion 
and reasons for relying on the CFI and RMSEA statistics over chi-square for 
assessing model fit with large samples). 
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A. OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS AND THE EXERCISE OF POWER 
An officer’s sex coincided with significantly more or less reliance on 
coercive, reward, and referent power, with males more likely than females 
to use coercive and reward power, and females more likely than males to 
rely on referent power.  This finding suggests that male officers might rely 
more heavily on less desirable forms of power relative to female officers, 
assuming that coercive and reward power are the least preferable from the 
standpoint of establishing officer legitimacy from an inmate’s perspective.  
The opposite sex effect on the use of referent power suggests that the use of 
coercive and reward power might vary directly at the expense of referent 
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power (as opposed to expert and positional power). 
An officer’s race / ethnicity was also significant for predicting reliance 
on a few different types of power.  That is, White Anglo officers were less 
likely to rely on expert power, referent power, and reward power relative to 
African-American and Latino officers.  Given the disproportionate over-
representation of minority inmates across prisons in both states, some of 
these differences in power bases may reflect greater tolerance and greater 
respect displayed by minority officers toward minority inmates.117 
There is no evidence to suggest that higher levels of education 
mattered for shaping officers’ preferences, although years of service were 
relevant.118  Specifically, officers with more service relied significantly less 
on coercive power while relying more on expert and positional power.  
Coercive power may vary at the expense of expert and positional power 
when considering the amount of time officers have worked within their 
state’s DOC.119  More experience appears to be relevant for reducing an 
officer’s reliance on coercive tactics while increasing reliance on his 
expertise as well as inmates’ confidence in his authority as each develops 
over time.120  Therefore, experience in the system as opposed to higher 
education might be more important for shaping the exercise of power and 
ultimately strengthening officer legitimacy. 
Findings for an officer’s supervisory status revealed significantly more 
reliance on expert and positional power among supervisors, which may be 
expected given that officers are more likely to be promoted to these 
positions based on their expertise and judiciousness, but also significantly 
more reliance on coercive and reward power.  The absence of a significant 
effect on referent power, however, suggests that supervisors may have been 
generally inclined to simply agree with each of the statements capturing 
more textbook methods of gaining compliance short of actually 
commanding inmate respect, perhaps due to less time spent in the types of 
interactions with inmates that are more common among line officers.  
Although not absolutely certain, we are inclined to believe that these 
particular findings are artifacts of a difference between supervisors and line 
officers in their interpretations of “acceptable” versus “preferred” power 
bases. 
 
117  This suggestion follows logically from the significant link between officer race and 
efficacy with inmates, and the fact that minorities are over-represented in prison. See Britton, 
supra note 69, at 97, 102.  
118  See LOMBARDO, supra note 22, at 94; Crouch & Marquart, supra note 70, at 100. 
119  See Hepburn, supra note 27, at 157.   
120  See LOMBARDO, supra note 22, at 94. 
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B. THE INFLUENCES OF OFFICERS’ EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIONS 
OF WORK 
Officers who interacted with more inmates on a typical shift perceived 
that they were more likely to gain inmate compliance due to their expertise, 
the respect they command from inmates, and from their authority as 
officers.  More interactions with inmates should lessen social distance 
between officers and inmates,121 possibly strengthening an officer’s 
confidence to rely on their training and expertise for dealing with resistant 
inmates while also granting more opportunities for officers to earn inmates’ 
respect.  The latter might also be facilitated by the nature of the prison 
environment where news of particular incidents between inmates and staff 
are widely known in the population.122  While this still leaves open the 
question of whether more interactions directly impact both officer expertise 
and the respect they garner from inmates, these findings suggest that face-
to-face contacts with more inmates is potentially important for 
demonstrating and establishing officers as legitimate authorities. 
Threats to officers and their perceptions of job safety were 
significantly linked to the use of referent and positional power, whereas 
fewer threats and perceptions of safer environments coincided with greater 
reliance on referent power.  These findings are consistent with the idea that 
less threatening environments might promote an officer’s ability to exercise 
referent power, and they reinforce Cartwright’s more general observation 
about organizational power and how a supervisor’s choice of power is 
influenced heavily by her perceptions of those she manages.123  We must 
also recognize the possibility that, given the cross-sectional survey data 
examined, officers who fail to command inmates’ respect might also behave 
in ways that provoke more threatening environments, although there were 
no significant empirical relationships between these independent variables 
and an officer’s use of coercive power.  Fewer inmate threats also coincided 
with greater reliance on positional power, consistent with the findings for 
referent power, although officers who perceived safer environments were 
actually more likely to rely on reward power.  This last finding might be a 
consequence of opportunity, where a safe environment is a necessary 
prerequisite for officers to rely on favors as incentives for inmates to 
comply with the rules, but this idea cannot be tested directly with our data. 
An interesting dichotomy emerged in the findings for officers’ 
perceptions of inmate compliance, where officers who perceived greater 
 
121  See Poole & Regoli, supra note 78, at 266. 
122  See Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 123. 
123  See Cartwright, supra note 75, at 41. 
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compliance were significantly more likely to rely on expert, referent, and 
positional power (as predicted), but were also more likely to rely on 
coercive power (a counterintuitive finding).  Both sets of findings, however, 
could reflect a different causal structure for inmate compliance.  
Specifically, the observation related to coercive power could simply reflect 
inmates’ reactions to the threat of force, where causality actually moves 
from officer threat to inmate compliance.  Similarly, but for a different 
group of officers, greater compliance might nurture officers’ abilities to rely 
on their expertise, the respect they command from inmates, and from their 
authority as officers.  This duality can only be tested with different data and 
is left for future research.  Nonetheless, the findings for expert, referent, and 
positional power are important because they demonstrate either (a) how the 
ability of officers to draw from these power bases is fed by inmates’ 
compliance, or (b) how the exercise of these forms of power can 
significantly improve compliance.   
Officers who claimed that they received adequate training on their job 
tasks were also more likely to rely on positional power, although these 
perceptions were unrelated to any other power base.  Nonetheless, more 
experience may enhance an officer’s authority status among inmates, not to 
mention its relevance for shaping an officer’s orientation towards 
inmates.124  Consistent with perceived training, greater pride with co-
workers also coincided with greater use of positional power.  Although 
intuitive, the absence of any other significant effect of co-worker pride on 
the remaining four power bases suggests that the effective performance of 
power-holders does not necessarily depend on their esprit de corps.125 
Greater support from co-workers was significantly linked to greater 
use of expert power only.  Similar to the results for job training and staff 
pride, this finding is in the predicted direction but modest considering that 
co-worker support was unrelated to the other four power bases.  Overall, 
aspects of officer–inmate interactions (face-to-face contacts, inmate 
compliance with versus threats to officers, and job safety) appear more 
relevant for shaping officer power bases compared to organizational and 
peer support (training, staff pride, and co-worker support).  This general 
theme downplays the importance of officer subcultures relative to officer–
inmate interactions for influencing how officers exercise their authority 
over prisoners. 
Work stress was no more relevant than staff pride and co-worker 
 
124  See LOMBARDO, supra note 22, at 48. 
125  See Steve Herbert, Tangled Up in Blue: Conflicting Paths to Police Legitimacy, 10 
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 481, 491 (2006) (discussing how police officers’ feelings of 
“honor” impact their use of force with citizens). 
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support for predicting an officer’s exercise of power, where the only 
significant finding involved a greater reliance on reward power among 
officers enduring greater work stress.  An officer’s role problems were 
slightly more relevant for shaping some of these outcomes, although the 
two significant effects were not in the predicted directions.  That is, officers 
scoring higher on the scale of role problems were significantly more likely 
to report relying on expert power, and significantly less likely to report 
reliance on coercive power.  Given that these models statistically controlled 
for training and job safety, it is feasible that, these other factors being equal, 
officers who choose to adopt particular power bases might actually have 
more conflict with their superiors.  Additional research is needed to identify 
whether the exercise of certain forms of power might actually shape role 
problems and conflict with superiors. 
C. PRISON LEVEL EFFECTS ON OFFICERS’ EXERCISE OF POWER 
Despite the significant zero-order effects of the four prison level 
factors on many of the outcomes examined, controlling for compositional 
differences in the level-1 measures through grand mean-centering served to 
render the vast majority of these level-2 effects nonsignificant.  Even so, 
there are two important observations about these higher-order effects.  First, 
officers working in facilities for women were significantly more likely to 
perceive a greater reliance on referent power, even after controlling for the 
sex composition of the workforce.  Considering that female inmates are 
generally more communal than male inmates, perhaps because women are 
more prone to seek connections with others in order to define their self-
worth,126 it is possible that officers are better able to garner respect from 
female inmates over time that favorably impacts the quality of interactions 
between officers and female inmates. 
Second, officers working with higher risk populations (average 
custody level) were generally more likely to rely on coercive power, 
consistent with the idea that more dangerous populations might lead 
officers to ultimately fall back on methods for gaining compliance that are 
ineffective for promoting inmates’ perceptions of officer legitimacy.127  The 
causal direction of this relationship, however, remains in question and 
cannot be estimated precisely without longitudinal data.  That is, do officers 
 
126  See CANDACE KRUTTSCHNITT & ROSEMARY GARTNER, MARKING TIME IN THE 
GOLDEN STATE: WOMEN’S IMPRISONMENT IN CALIFORNIA 124–126 (Albert Blumstein & 
David Farrington eds., 1st ed. 2005); Emily M. Wright et al., Gender-responsive Lessons 
Learned and Policy Implications for Women in Prison: A Review, 39 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 
1612, 1622 (2012). 
127  See Hepburn, supra note 27, at 159. 
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fall back on a greater use of coercion because inmates initially display less 
respect and greater cynicism, or do a lack of respect and greater cynicism 
follow greater use of coercion at the expense of other methods to gain 
compliance?  It might be more realistic to assume that both processes occur 
within a cycle of reactions to each group’s behavior.  The same logic also 
applies to situations where officers are more likely to rely on referent, 
expert, or positional power where inmates in certain environments (e.g., 
lower security) are more likely to perceive officers as legitimate authority 
regardless of how officers behave initially, resulting in less conflict between 
the two groups and enabling officers to rely more on these other forms of 
power. 
Architecture and population size were relevant for predicting the use of 
coercive power, where officers in prisons with linear designs and primarily 
cells, as well as officers working with larger inmate populations, were 
generally more likely to perceive greater use of coercive power.  Even when 
controlling for the significant impact of custody level on this same 
outcome, these aspects of the work environment might generate a more 
coercive response by officers when dealing with inmates.  Scholars have 
suggested that an employee’s ability to effectively communicate with others 
might weaken in larger organizations with greater social density,128 and this 
could lead some officers to rely more on force and less on diplomacy in 
their interactions with inmates.  Specific to prisons, officers working with 
larger populations may often face greater uncertainty about their work.  
Future research is needed to more closely investigate whether larger 
populations and more restrictive designs somehow inhibit officers from 
choosing more benevolent approaches to gaining inmate compliance. 
D. FINDINGS ON THE INTERACTIVE CHARACTER OF LEGITIMACY 
As previously described, the second part of our study involved a 
facility level analysis of the correspondence between officers’ self-reported 
power bases and inmates’ perceptions of officer legitimacy.  Only the 
empirical relationships of interest are presented here even though they were 
derived from bi-level models controlling for compositional differences in 
inmate populations across facilities, as previously described.129 Again, and 
in contrast to the more rigorous analyses of officer and facility effects on 
officers’ exercise of power, findings from this next stage of the study 
 
128  See Szilagyi & Holland, supra note 89, at 28–29 (reviewing empirical studies which 
suggest adverse effects of greater social density on work performance and satisfaction, 
particularly in contexts where “interpersonal communications” are necessary). 
129  All level-1 estimates and model statistics are available upon request from the first 
author.  
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should be treated as exploratory since they reflect facility level relationships 
based on cross-sectional data. 
Evidence emerged providing support for the idea that higher levels of 
officers’ perceived use of coercive power coincided with significantly lower 
levels of inmates’ perceptions of officer legitimacy (i.e., less likely to agree 
that officers are fair, equitable, and do a good job).130  This finding is 
consistent with Bottoms and Tankebe’s argument, described earlier, in 
addition to Tyler’s broader argument that the use of coercive power can 
weaken individuals’ beliefs that the rules and decisions of authorities are in 
some way right or proper and ought to be followed.131 
Support was also found for the idea that higher levels of officers’ 
perceived use of expert power corresponded with significantly higher levels 
of inmates’ perceptions of competence, fairness, and equity.132  Professor 
Schaffer discussed the importance of political authorities’ demonstrations 
of expertise for legitimizing their positions in traditional and modern 
societies.133  Finally, and most compelling, support was found for the idea 
that greater perceived use of positional power by officers was significantly 
related to more favorable perceptions by inmates134 and underscores the 
argument that fairness in treatment can effectively build confidence in the 
eyes of offenders regarding rule enforcers as proper and just.135 
These findings are noteworthy, particularly those for positional power, 
because each one reflects an empirical relationship between officer survey 
items and inmate survey items.  In other words, how officers perceive their 
use of power seems compatible with inmates’ perceptions of officers.  Of 
course, it is important to study these types of relationships at the individual 
level simply because most prisons include officers with different 
orientations toward their work.136  Short of committing the ecological 
fallacy, we recognize that these facility level findings should only be treated 
as encouraging for future research at the individual level. 
 
130  b = -0.50; seb = 0.20; p < .05; n2 = 45. 
131  Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 125; see Morris Zelditch, Processes of 
Legitimation: Recent Developments and New Directions, 64 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 4, 5 (2001); 
Tyler, supra note 26, at 376. 
132  b = 0.61; seb = 0.20; p < .05; n2 = 45. 
133  See Simon Schaffer, In the Know, in 16 LONDON REV. BOOKS 17, 17–18 (1994).  
134  b = 0.60; seb = 0.21; p < .05; n2 = 45. 
135  See Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 121. 
136  As demonstrated time and again by prison scholars such as Crewe, Liebling, Sparks, 
and colleagues, cited infra. 
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E. A MORE NUANCED UNDERSTANDING OF LEGITIMACY IN PRISON 
Our contextualized analysis of correctional officers’ perceived use of 
power across prison settings demonstrates the fruitfulness of focusing on 
the exercise of authority by “junior power-holders” in order to provide a 
richer understanding of legitimacy in a prison setting.137  That is, when 
considering the officials who have the most contact with power recipients, 
not only do we gain an appreciation for the influences on their actions that 
constitute barriers to effectively establishing legitimate authority, we also 
see how some of these factors are beyond their control (i.e., organizational 
training, prison security level, physical environment, and size of the inmate 
population).  Applied to other settings more generally, the external 
influences on the behaviors of junior power-holders are equally as salient (if 
not more so) for discussions of legitimacy relative to understanding the 
orientations and actions of their superiors who interact far less with their 
constituents.138  Hence, an understanding of legitimacy and its feasibility 
might incorporate a more substantive focus on the extent to which junior 
power-holders’ methods of exercising their authority over power recipients 
is shaped by factors outside their control. In a prison context, based on our 
findings, such factors might include larger offender populations, more 
serious offender populations, and more sterile physical environments.  
Downplaying the role of contextual effects creates an illusion of free will in 
the exercise of power that outsiders, including academics, impose on the 
behaviors of government officials.  Specific to prison organizations, and 
consistent with Raz’s study, prison contexts that necessarily shape greater 
use of coercive force by officers are likely to undermine an administration’s 
ability to “secure from their audience a recognition of their right to rule.”139  
On the other hand, a context that allows officers to exercise authority in 
ways that preserve the dignity and respect of inmates can facilitate an 
administration’s valid claim to legitimate authority.  Liebling’s descriptions 
of prison contexts that shape the moral performance of prison staff, 
particularly those that coincide with more respectful inmate-officer 
relations, are potentially applicable in this regard and move beyond the 
prison level factors examined here.140 
This focus also highlights the challenges to ceasing the cycle of officer 
coercion and inmate cynicism that exists once officers come to rely on 
 
137  Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 161. 
138  Id. at 153. 
139  Id. at 126 (quoting RAZ, supra note 2, at 128). 
140  See LIEBLING, MORAL PERFORMANCE, supra note 38, at 469–70 (underscoring the 
potential relevance of climate factors such as the social structure of inmates and officers for 
a more in-depth understanding of officer-inmate relations). 
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coercion precisely because inmates do not acknowledge them as legitimate 
authority.  Although prisons are to some extent coercive organizations,141 
prison administrators recognize the importance of avoiding physical and 
verbal coercion whenever possible even though the use of force, on 
occasion, is inevitable.  Shrewd power-holders recognize the need to avoid 
habitual exercise of coercive power lest it results in a complete breakdown 
of consensual authority.142  Therefore, studies of what enhances the exercise 
of referent, expert, and positional power at the expense of coercion and 
reward power will not only highlight the limits to free will among junior 
power-holders, thus incorporating these considerations into theoretical 
discussions of legitimacy, but will also provide insight into the feasibility of 
capitalizing on factors within the control of officials for counterbalancing 
the limits on choice of power. 
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY IN 
PRISON 
Bottoms and Tankebe argued that the “dual and interactive character of 
legitimacy” demands analysis of both power-holders’ and subjects’ 
behaviors and perceptions.143  This approach should provide a more 
complete understanding of legitimacy and how it is established and 
maintained over time.144  To this end, our study falls short in two respects 
including the absence of (a) a longitudinal research design capturing the 
potentially dynamic nature of this process, and (b) an individual level 
analysis of inmates’ perceptions of officers’ exercise of power.  
Nonetheless, the study provides an important step in this direction by 
shedding light on potential facilitators and barriers to the cultivation of 
legitimacy in a prison setting by focusing on both officer and prison level 
influences on how officers choose to exercise their authority.  As such, this 
study responds to Bottoms and Tankebe’s call for related studies on the 
actions of “junior power-holders,” given their more direct contact with 
subjects, and whether their behaviors are consistent with the cultivation of 
legitimate authority.145  The ability to establish legitimate authority in 
prisons is central to their safety and order, to the extent that legitimacy 
contributes to inmates’ compliance with prison rules, and is also potentially 
relevant to reducing recidivism in as much as criminogenic behavior during 
 
141  See Hepburn, supra note 27, at 145. 
142  See WEBER, supra note 5, at 56.  
143  Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 119–20. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. at 119–20.  
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incarceration is linked to the same behavior after release.146 
This type of research is also a necessary element to distinguishing 
inmate compliance grounded in “dull compulsion” from compliance based 
on officer characteristics and behaviors,147 which prison scholars have 
observed can vary substantially across officers as well as prison settings.148  
Many of the officers we talked with recognized situations when inmates 
who were more structured in their daily schedules often complied with 
directives simply out of routine and without much thought. Based on our 
observations of these officers over an extensive time period, they appear to 
have a very good general understanding of why inmates comply with or 
resist their orders, which is why the survey items tapped general behaviors 
as opposed to specific instances.  This observation is also consistent with 
the facility level findings described above regarding significant 
correspondence between officers’ self-reported power bases and inmates’ 
perceptions of officer fairness and competence.149 
Overall, findings suggest that both officer and prison-level factors are 
relevant for predicting how officers exercise their authority, implying that 
even the best intentions by officers can be undone, depending on the 
setting.  Specifically, assignments to higher risk populations (based on sex 
and custody level), to larger populations, and to facilities with older 
architectural designs might contribute to greater reliance on coercive power 
while making it more challenging for officers to garner respect among 
inmates.  Given the individual level findings, however, it appears that the 
challenge might be met with considerations of particular attributes of 
officers and their experiences.  Bottoms and Tankebe alluded to the 
relevance of officer population composition to the subject, and here we 
found a link between power bases and an officer’s sex and race.150  For 
example, if female and minority officers are less prone to use coercion and 
rewards while being more prone to relying on their expertise and the respect 
garnered from inmates, then pursuing these types of hires could have a 
favorable effect for the cultivation of legitimacy.  An officer’s tenure in the 
position is also relevant for less reliance on coercion and more on expertise, 
suggesting that incentives to reduce the turnover of the custodial workforce 
 
146  See Benjamin Steiner, Measuring and Explaining Inmate Misconduct, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT (forthcoming) (John Wooldredge and 
Paula Smith eds., Oxford Handbooks Online 2016). 
147
 CARRABINE, supra note 35, at 38. 
148  See BEN CREWE, THE PRISONER SOCIETY 105 (2009); LIEBLING, MORAL 
PERFORMANCE, supra note 38, at 333–66; Sparks et al., supra note 32, at 203.   
149  CARRABINE, supra note 35, at 36–38. 
150  See Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 1, at 163. 
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could contribute to more pervasive legitimate authority in prison. 
 Perhaps more difficult to control are officers’ experiences with 
inmates themselves, although these interactions seem to matter much more 
than possible organizational and peer influences.  This is not to say that the 
latter are irrelevant, given that better training, stronger esprit de corps, 
greater co-worker support, and fewer role problems were linked to either 
greater reliance on positional or expert power as well as less reliance on 
coercive power.  However, both the prevalence and magnitude of effects 
reflecting officer-inmate interactions were greater by comparison (i.e., 
number of inmates an officer interacts with on a regular basis, inmate 
compliance versus threats, and job safety).  This observation might be 
somewhat intuitive because the exercise of authority requires interaction, 
and we did not examine these relationships longitudinally which leaves 
open the possibility that the exercise of more humane forms of power is 
what generates such things as more frequent inmate contacts, compliance 
(versus threats), and job safety.  Future longitudinal studies will be better 
able to identify the causal structure of these relationships and whether they 
are non-recursive.  On the other hand, our findings do suggest possible 
benefits of corrections administrators placing heavier priorities on training 
and staff morale. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The relevance of our analysis of officer and prison-level effects on 
how officers exercise power over inmates lies in the implications of 
different power bases for shaping the legitimacy of rule enforcers.  
Following Bottoms and Tankebe’s call for research on the actions of 
“junior” power-holders who interact most often with citizens and offenders 
(such as police and correctional line officers), the bulk of our analysis 
focused on bi-level effects on correctional officers’ perceptions of how they 
manage inmates.151  This analysis was followed by a more exploratory 
analysis of how officers exercise power might be relevant for shaping 
inmates’ perceptions of officer legitimacy.  Overall, we found considerable 
evidence that the choice of power bases is influenced by a number of 
factors at both the officer and prison level, and many of these might be 
manipulated in order to cultivate legitimacy in a prison setting.  Given the 
findings from our facility-level analysis of empirical links between different 
power bases and inmates’ perceptions of officers, efforts to improve 
legitimacy in prisons by altering officers’ reliance on particular power bases 
seem worthwhile. 
 
151  See id. at 161. 
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Related to the last point, a contribution of our study to theoretical 
discussions of legitimacy and its cultivation in a prison setting lies in 
highlighting influences on junior power-holders’ exercise of authority that 
are beyond their control, some of which are contextual (i.e., facility design 
as well as the size, sex, and security risk of a facility’s population). 
Although not limited to contextual effects (i.e., an officer’s training and 
years of service were also relevant while operating outside the control of the 
individual officer), these types of findings underscore how the seemingly 
discretionary behaviors of officers are dictated to some extent by their 
organizational environments.  Returning to the point above, this recognition 
should inspire discussions of hypothetical micro and macro influences on 
officers’ reliance on certain power bases and the feasibility of altering 
factors outside their control for lessening reliance on coercive power and, in 
turn, for cultivating legitimacy in a prison setting. 
More specific to our empirical findings, the first part of our study 
revealed that officer characteristics and work experiences as well as prison 
characteristics are relevant for shaping the exercise of power, but personal 
characteristics appear to matter more than work experiences which, in turn, 
are more relevant than prison context.  Regarding background factors, 
officers claimed to adopt more progressive and less restrictive approaches 
to gaining inmate compliance when they were female, minority, and had 
worked longer for the state’s DOC.  Amount of education did not matter, 
and results for supervisory status (comparing supervisors to line officers) 
were mixed.  This summary is very general, however, given some of the 
nuances in findings for some predictors across all five outcomes. 
Findings for officers’ work experiences and perceptions were not as 
clear-cut although aspects of officer–inmate interactions (face-to-face 
contacts, inmate compliance with versus threats to officers, and job safety) 
appear more relevant for shaping officer power bases compared to 
organizational and peer support (training, staff pride, and co-worker 
support).  There is evidence to suggest that perceptions of greater on-the-job 
safety, more face-to-face interactions with inmates, greater inmate 
compliance, and fewer threats by inmates were more conducive to officers 
reporting the use of expert, referent, and positional power.  On the other 
hand, the amount of training received, perceptions of job stress, role 
problems, and co-worker pride and support were less relevant in that each 
factor was a significant predictor of only one of the five outcomes. 
Facility level effects appeared comparable in importance to the 
indicators of organizational and peer support at level-1, with each level-2 
factor predicting only one of the five outcomes.  Nonetheless, all four of 
these effects are theoretically intuitive, where officers relied more on 
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referent power in prisons for women versus more on coercive power in 
larger and higher-risk populations as well as in facilities with older 
architectural designs (i.e., linear designs with primarily cells instead of 
dormitories). 
Not all of these findings translate into realistic policy implications, 
although our findings imply some possible benefits to enhancing the 
training of officers and staff morale (encompassing staff pride as well as 
support among co-workers and between line officers and administrators) for 
enabling officers to rely more on expert and positional power while 
reducing reliance on coercive power.  More effective policies might also 
focus on improving job safety as well as officer retention, given that greater 
perceived safety was linked to the use of referent power, while more years 
of experience coincided with less reliance on coercive power and greater 
reliance on expert and positional power.  Efforts to hire more women and 
minorities might also help at the officer level, as female officers were more 
prone to exercising referent power while less prone to using coercion and 
offering rewards, and minority officers (African-Americans and Latinos) 
were more likely to rely on expert and referent power.  Structural factors at 
the prison level are a bit more difficult to manipulate, however, given state 
budget constraints to reduce prison populations and build newer prisons,152 
an inability to control the sex of inmate populations, and the challenges to 
altering risk classification in ways that would reduce officers’ reliance on 
coercive power.153  Additional research is needed to test the validity of these 
observations, particularly in regard to Bottoms and Tankebe’s preference 
for longitudinal research154 in conjunction with studies of both power-
holders and their subjects’ perceptions and behaviors.  Moreover, prison 
level factors must be explored in greater detail given the limited sample size 
and number of predictors examined. 
The facility level analysis of empirical links between officers’ use of 
different forms of power and inmates’ perceptions of officer legitimacy 
produced evidence favoring Bottoms and Tankebe’s dialogic approach to 
understanding legitimate authority. Despite the limits of this segment of our 
study, these observations are encouraging for future research that can 
incorporate a longitudinal component at the individual level.  As a potential 
guide for related research, here we found that officers who claimed to 
exercise more expert power or positional power were more likely to work in 
prisons where inmates generally perceived officers more favorably.  
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Alternately, officers who self-reported greater reliance on coercive power 
were more apt to work in prisons where inmates maintained more negative 
perceptions of officers’ authority.  If other empirical studies reinforce this 
conclusion, then focusing on what influences the exercise of power among 
correctional officers should enlighten discussions of the cultivation of 
legitimacy in a prison setting.  The feasibility of building legitimacy in this 
context has been demonstrated previously and holds promise for improving 
inmates’ compliance with the law, both before and after release.155 
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